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 Cooperative budgeting arrangements between state and local governments jointly fund 
local programs. The mix of state and local revenues contributed to these arrangements can 
change as budget priorities shift over time. This study examines the strategic choices public 
officials make as they determine their contributions to jointly-funded programs. Using a game 
theory model known as the “Diner’s Dilemma”, the analysis explores how each level of 
government considers how much revenue to contribute and whether it can induce its partner to 
increase their level of support. This analysis applies primarily to local programs with regional 
externalities. The model illustrates how local efforts to aggressively try to shift costs to the state 
government can backfire, particularly during periods of state fiscal stress.  
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Many types of local public services and infrastructure are funded through 
cooperative budgeting arrangements between multiple government entities (Mitchell and 
Thurmaier 2011; Khalid, Matkin, and Morse 2017). How do public officials respond 
when their co-funding partners cut their contributions to the shared activity? Letting 
overall funding drop would require cuts to services and reduce maintenance to public 
infrastructure. Increasing contributions to offset the cuts by the other layer of government 
may require higher taxes or sacrificing other service responsibilities. Choosing either 
option is especially difficult if the outcome has strategic implications for future rounds of 
intergovernmental budgeting. For example, local officials may fear that increasing local 
taxes to offset cuts to state aid may lead the state to make further cuts to 
intergovernmental grants.  
Responding to cuts in intergovernmental support is especially relevant during 
periods of economic decline. States once interested in supporting local economic 
development projects may realign their priorities towards unemployment benefits, 
Medicaid and other elements of the state social safety net. For example, in 2011 Nebraska 
cut transportation infrastructure aid to cities and counties as an effort to close its state 
budget gap. In 2015, when a proposal was brought to the state legislature to restore the 
aid, state officials were concerned that local governments would use the aid to lower 
local property taxes rather than increase overall transportation investment (Hammel 
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2015). Officials at the state and local level are interested in both achieving public service 
objectives and keeping their share of the cost of the joint service from rising. 
Another side of this issue is whether state governments co-funding services with 
fiscally distressed local governments are willing to increase their contributions. If state 
officials observe that a local government can’t sustain its current level of spending, under 
what conditions is it more likely to increase aid or alternatively allow the joint service to 
diminish or even be terminated? Local governments regularly lobby their state 
governments for supplemental funding. Developing a conceptual framework for better 
understanding which services and in which economic conditions the state is more likely 
to offer emergency support may help local officials be more strategic as they seek state 
aid. 
The effect of collaborative budgeting on administrative behavior is the subject of 
a small, but growing literature. Khalid et al. (2017) conduct a case study of joint capital 
budgeting arrangements and identify a variety of motivations and ownership structures 
for these partnerships. Their study revealed that two most frequently cited motivations for 
entering into collaborative budgeting agreements were cost sharing and overcoming 
collective action problems. Many capital projects provide benefits that expand beyond the 
borders of a single government and sharing the funding responsibility helps ensure that 
the infrastructure is funded and scaled to an efficient level.   
There are many unanswered questions about how these collaborative budgeting 
affects administrative behavior. Mitchell and Thurmaier (2011) conducted an exploratory 
analysis of several public collaboration networks in the Chicago area and found 
significant shortfalls in the financial reporting on these agreements. Additionally, these 
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arrangements suffered from a lack of transparent reporting on the goals, performance 
measures and overall commitments to the agreement by the participating governments.  
The uncertainty associated with these agreements creates an environment that 
fosters self-serving administrative behavior. Once public officials enter into collaborative 
budgeting agreements they may feel the incentive to try to shift an increasing share of the 
joint fiscal burden to their partner governments. This incentive is an example of the moral 
hazard problem that Posner (2009) identified in his essay on the challenges associated 
with intergovernmental collaboration.  
The objective of this study is to develop a conceptual model for the strategic 
decisions that public administrators face once they have entered into a joint funding 
agreement. The model focuses particularly on services and public infrastructure that 
generate positive externalities and therefore generate the kind of collective action 
problem identified by Khalid et al. (2011). One contribution of this paper is that it 
introduces a new application of game theory to intergovernmental finance. The 
behavioral predictions generated by this theoretical approach can help public 
administrators consider their options more deliberately. This model also generates 
testable hypotheses that may guide future empirical research.  
The challenge of deciding how much to contribute to a jointly funded service has 
similarities to a problem commonly encountered when a group of friends go out to dinner 
and agree ahead of time to split the bill evenly. While ordering from the menu, each diner 
must decide whether to order an expensive dish and a nice glass of wine, or a cheaper 
dish and just have a soft drink. Diners that ordered more expensive dishes than their 
companions are subsidized, while those that were more restrained end up paying more for 
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their meal than the cost of what they actually consumed. Similarly, local officials don’t 
want to have to pay the full cost of a bridge that provide broad regional transportation 
benefits, and states don’t want their aid to allow localities to reduce contributions to joint 
services.  
The problem just described is known as the “Diner’s Dilemma” in the field of 
game theory economics. The Diner’s Dilemma is used in this paper to describe the 
strategies that state and local governments employ in their fiscal policies relating to 
intergovernmental transfers. This paper is the first application of the Diner’s Dilemma to 
intergovernmental financing decisions. This model may increase public officials’ 
understudying and awareness of the strategic implications of their choices when engaged 
in co-funding relationships between state and local government. Additionally, the model 
generates multiple predictions that may help guide future empirical fiscal research. The 
primary result of this model is that it helps reveal how geographic externalities created by 
co-funded services play a major role in determining the types of strategies state and local 
governments use. These results give insight into the conditions when states are willing to 
bail out local governments that are struggling to finance local services. 
 
Jointly Funded Local Programs 
State and local governments jointly funding public programs indicates that both 
levels of government share an interest and responsibility for certain services. Consider an 
arrangement where local governments received no aid and were solely responsible for 
funding their activities with local taxes, charges and borrowing. Voters and creditors 
would very likely view the obligations of sub-state governments as “sovereign”, and it 
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would be irrational for localities to expect the state government to offer a bailout during 
periods of fiscal distress. This independence would influence the total level of local 
public spending. Introducing state aid would be expected to change the way the local 
governments spend and change their expectations of the fiscal implications of a 
recession.  
Theoretical and empirical studies in political economics suggest that individuals 
view intergovernmental revenue and "own-source" revenues through different lenses 
(Gramlich 1977; Nice 1987). Intergovernmental revenues can create the appearance that 
local public spending is funded by nonresidents (Oates 1999). Intergovernmental revenue 
programs often supply concentrated local benefits that are funded by a common pool of 
resources (Shepsle, Weingast, and Johnsen 1981). Local voters and local politicians 
receive fiscal or political benefits from intergovernmental revenue programs without 
internalizing their full cost, causing them to demand more expenditures funded by 
intergovernmental revenue than own-source fees, charges, or taxation. The vast empirical 
literature on the “flypaper effect” indicates that increases in intergovernmental revenue 
rarely lead to tax reductions.  Contrarily, increases in intergovernmental revenue 
stimulate much higher expenditures than do similar increases in own-source revenues 
(Hines and Thaler 1995; Fisher and Papke 2000). Lee and Plummer (2007) find that 
intergovernmental revenues increase the growth in budgeted expenditures year over year 
in local school district governments.  The universal theme propagated is that 
intergovernmental revenue modifies the perceptions and beliefs about the levels of 
sustainable sub-state spending.  
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562735
 
 7 
Empirical literature has established a link between intergovernmental revenue 
dependence and the positive growth of government (West and Winer 1980; Rodden 
2003). When intergovernmental revenue as a proportion of total revenue is increasing, 
sub-state governments move toward intergovernmental revenue dependence.  In this 
context, dependence refers to the share of revenues used to finance local services that 
come from the state government. Local governments that are highly dependent on state 
aid, when presented during an adverse fiscal shock, are placed in a potentially inflexible 
position to raise additional revenue. Without capacity to increase their own revenues, 
sub-state governments may be forced to cut service, run a deficit, or delay payment to 
both employees and contractors.   
If a financial situation escalates into a fiscal crisis in which the sub-state 
government is unable to maintain a positive fiscal position, the sub-state government may 
claim, with some justification, that it is not responsible for the situation due to the 
dependence on state intergovernmental revenue. If the sub-state government is successful 
in this strategy, it may be very difficult for the state government to resist political 
pressure from bondholders, banks, public sector unions, and other stakeholders. This 
game provides an incentive to intergovernmental dependent sub-state governments to be 
fiscally irresponsible. Even if such sub-state governments could take simple but 
politically costly steps to avoid an impending fiscal crisis, it may be more rewarding to 
position themselves for bailouts. The pressure placed on the state government's own 
creditworthiness might be called into question if it fails to enforce a loan contract against 
a defaulting sub-state government. Approached by creditors and facing the prospect of 
failing in its obligation to enforce property rights, the state government might see a 
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bailout as the simplest solution. The perceived probability of future bailouts would be 
expected to increase with intergovernmental revenue dependence.  
Overall the empirical evidence is mixed as to whether or not sub-state 
governments exhibit expenditure responses to intergovernmental revenues. When 
spending responses are found, there is the additional question of whether sub-state 
governments pick up the slack and spend more in response to intergovernmental revenues 
(fiscal replacement), or spend less in response to intergovernmental revenues (fiscal 
restraint). Stine (1994) studied 66 Pennsylvania county governments and found that own 
source revenue fell in response to federal intergovernmental revenue, while county 
spending rose in response to intergovernmental revenue from state governments, an 
asymmetric outcome. Gamkhar and Oates (1996) used aggregate time series data for state 
and local expenditures finding symmetric state expenditure response to 
intergovernmental revenue.  Modeling with artificial data has shown that all models 
tested exhibit peculiarities such as discontinuities in marginal responses and 
counterintuitive predictions, which are not generally observed in economic behavior in 
real world data (Shama Gamkhar and Olson 2001) 
 
Framework for the Game 
The strategies behind intergovernmental aid can be modeled as a “diner’s 
dilemma” game. The diner’s dilemma references the problem when a large party goes to 
a restaurant with an expectation of splitting the check evenly among all diners. Each 
individual, when deciding what to order, chooses between an inexpensive meal and a 
more costly dish. If they had to pay the full price they would order the cheaper meal, but 
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they might order the expensive dish if they expected that some of the cost may be spread 
to other members of the party. Additionally, diners might fear that if they order a cheaper 
meal they would have to pay more than the value of the meal they enjoyed once the 
check has been split evenly.  As a result, everyone in the dinner party has an incentive to 
order the more expensive meal (Gneezy, Haruvy, and Yafe 2004). 
Applying this game to a governmental context, state and local governments must 
decide how much to contribute to a jointly funded service and attempt to shift more of the 
cost to another level of government. Local governments hope the state will increase its 
funding share by providing additional intergovernmental aid, while the state would like 
the local government to use their own-source revenues (taxes, fees, and charges) to 
finance services. During economic downturn or other forms of fiscal stress, local 
governments may try to lower their taxes and hope that the state government would offset 
reduced spending with an increased level of intergovernmental aid. The state may be 
willing to provide aid to help offset the effects of recessions and other types of fiscal 
stress, but it would not want to encourage local governments to lower their taxes in hopes 
of getting additional state aid. 
The formal objective of the game for state and local governments is to maximize 
the net political benefits received from providing local public services. Governments 
receive political benefits from public spending, especially from tangible projects that 
voters are able to observe and experience. Generating the revenue to pay for this 
spending, however generates political costs. From the public officials’ perspective, an 
optimal fiscal structure maximizes the net political benefits associated with public 
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spending (Hettich and Winer 1984; 1988). In other words, they seek to get the greatest 
political benefit from spending at lowest political cost.  
For services that are jointly funded by state and local government, both parties 
incur political costs and receive political benefits. Local governments fund the joint 
service with direct spending, while the state makes an intergovernmental transfer in the 
form of a block grant. The state pays for these grants with state-level taxes. The model 
presented below examines how much support each level of government chooses to 
provide within a strategic context in order to identify the optimal strategies for state and 
local governments. This model can then be used to examine how fiscal stress may 
influence budgetary policy. 
The first part of the model describes how local governments approach this game. 
Equation (1) describes local officials’ goal of maximizing their net political benefits from 
providing public services. Local officials seek to maximize U, which is the sum of net 
political benefits received from each of the N taxpayers residing the jurisdiction.  Net 
political benefits are the difference between the political benefit received from local 
public spending (E) and the political cost of levying local taxes (v). The political support 
that taxpayer i provides to the government in return for spending E is expressed by the 
function b(). The political cost of collecting v dollars in taxes from taxpayer i is given by 
the cost function c(). The sum of net political benefits across the N taxpayers is the total 
net benefit public officials receive for a given level of public spending. This may be 
expressed as votes or other signs of public satisfaction with the current fiscal policies.  
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Local government spending is subject to a budget constraint. Total spending must 
equal total local taxes and other own-source revenues (L) plus intergovernmental aid (I). 
The budget is balanced when spending (E) minus taxes (L) and intergovernmental 
revenue (I) is equal to zero. The taxes paid by each local voter is (𝑣𝑖) is simply the total 
amount of local taxes divided by the number of voters.  
Figure 1.  Optimizing Net Political Benefits from Local Public Spending 
 
  




Figure 1 depicts the local government’s optimization of its provision of public 
services, (?̅?).  The 𝑏𝑖(?̅?) curve depicts diminishing marginal political benefits derived 
from ?̅?. The 𝑐𝑖(𝑣𝑖) curve depicts increasing marginal political costs of raising sufficient 
local revenue to fund the local service. The optimal level of local spending maximizes the 
net political benefit, or the vertical distance between 𝑏𝑖(?̅?) and 𝑐𝑖(𝑣𝑖).  This is shown at 
the point ?̅?1. 
The scenario depicted in Figure 1 leaves the local government alone to fund the 
local service. Figure 2 introduces supplemental state funding. The effect of the state aid is 
to shift the  𝑐𝑖(𝑣𝑖) curve to the right by the amount of the intergovernmental aid (𝐼). Even 
if the local government reduced its taxes to zero, it would still spend 𝐼 on the local 
service. The effect of 𝐼 on the level of ?̅? depends on the shape of the benefit and cost 
curves.  The level of spending may increase, but if the local government chooses to 
reduce its own contribution and increase its net political benefits by cutting taxes, then 
the effect of 𝐼 on ?̅? would be reduced1.  The local government choses a new optimum 
point at ?̅?2 which maximizes the distance between 𝑏𝑖(?̅?) and the new shifted cost curve.  
The service is now jointly funded by 𝐼 and local own-source revenues. Up to this point, 
local fiscal policy is static, meaning the local government takes the state’s provision of 𝐼 
as a given. We now introduce the state’s optimization model which will all the analysis to 
introduce dynamic strategic behavior to the game. 
                                                 
1 There is a broad and well known public finance literature examining the effect of intergovernmental aid 
on public spending. A part of it has examined an empirical result known as the “flypaper effect” (Wyckoff 
1991; Hines and Thaler 1995; S. Gamkhar and Oates 1996; Turnbull 1998; Becker 1996). This is the 
observation that, although public funds are fungible, lump-sum grants appear to create a larger boost to 
spending in the function that they targeted than the income elasticity of demand for public services would 
suggest.  Intergovernmental revenue tends to “stick” where it initially lands. 
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Figure 2. Optimizing Net Political Benefits from State Public Spending 
 
The state government maximizes a slightly more complicated utility function, as 
depicted by Equation 2. The state provides two types of public services: state level 
services through direct spending (S) and local services (?̅?)  that are financed with 
intergovernmental aid (I) to the local government. The function 𝑔(𝑆) represents the 
political benefits that the state receives from state-level services, while  𝑏?̂?(?̅?) describes 
the political benefits state officials receive from local services.  
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𝑠. 𝑡.   𝑆 + 𝐼 − 𝑅 = 0 
 
  
Where:   
𝑏?̂?(?̅?) = 𝑓(?̅?)  for ?̅? < 𝑀 
 
  













The most important difference between the behavior of state and local 
governments is that state officials’ interest in local spending is based on preventing 
negative geographic externalities. Negative externalities refer to spillover effects from 
one community that harm other communities within the state. If a county operates and 
maintains flood control and wastewater treatment infrastructure, the state may be 
interested in supporting this program because these facilities may provide benefits and 
protection to other communities outside of the county.  
For some local services, like education or transportation infrastructure, the state 
has an interest in ensuring that a minimum quality threshold (M) is met throughout the 
state. Levels of service beyond that threshold reside entirely within the local jurisdiction 
and aren’t a concern for the state government. For example, a state may help fund 
programs that support literacy and math, but not provide targeted grants that support arts 
and foreign language classes. The state provides 𝐼 to ensure that all jurisdictions are able 
to finance the minimum threshold that mitigates the primary negative externalities. In 
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contrast, local governments can receive the political benefits from all levels of spending 
on E, even in excess of M. 
The state’s political benefits function for the co-funded local service, 𝑏?̂?(?̅?), is 
split at (M). When ?̅? is less than M the state receives political benefits from any increase 
to spending on the joint service. Once ?̅? has reached M, however, the state receives no 
additional benefit from higher levels of spending. The 𝑏?̂?(?̅?) curve flattens at 𝜃 for all 
spending above the threshold. This reflects that the level of spending is sufficient to 
eliminate any negative regional externalities and further spending just benefits the 
residents of the local governments.  The shape of 𝑏?̂?(?̅?) for ?̅? < 𝑀 describes the political 
benefits the state receives from local serves that are below its minimum threshold. This 
function can take multiple forms and the local government may not know the state’s true 
preferences for below-threshold spending. This uncertainty becomes a key component in 
the game.  
At one extreme, the state may derive no political benefits from ?̅? < 𝑀 and 𝑏?̂?(?̅?) 
is equal to zero at that range. Figure 2 depicts this scenario. The state’s political cost 
curve, 𝑐?̂?(𝑣?̂?), intersects horizontal axis point L, indicating the local government’s 
contribution to the joint service. The state derives zero political benefits from L, which 
falls below its minimum threshold, and would therefore raise 𝐼1 in state tax revenues and 
provide a grant to the local government. Total spending on the local service increases to 
M, and the state receives 𝜃 − 𝑐?̂?(𝑣?̂?; ?̅?) in net political benefits.  
 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562735
 
 16 
If the local government responds to the state aid by cutting its own taxes, the 
state’s political cost curve, 𝑐?̂?(𝑣?̂?), will shift to the left.  If the shift is relatively small and 
the intersection of 𝑏?̂?(?̅?) and 𝑐?̂?(𝑣?̂?) remains to the right of M, the state will increase 
intergovernmental aid to 𝐼2, as shown in Figure 3. This action reduces the net political 
benefits the state received, but is the new optimum. In this case the local government has 
successfully shifted some of the cost of funding the local service to the state government. 
If the cut is sufficiently large, however, and the state’s political cost curve 𝑐?̂?(𝑣?̂?) shifts so 
far to the left that it no longer intersects 𝑏?̂?(?̅?), then the state will eliminate funding for 
the local service entirely. In this scenario, the political cost for the state to increase its aid 
to 𝐼3 outweighs its concern for mitigating any negative externalities. Local managers 
must be cautious when trying to increase their reliance on intergovernmental revenue 
because the state may withdraw funding if it perceives local governments aren’t putting 
in sufficient tax effort on their own. In other words, if local governments try too hard to 
dine at the state’s expense, the state may ask for a separate check.  
If a local jurisdiction reduces its own-source support for a service that the state 
has an interest in, then the state must balance its cost of increasing I with the benefits it 
receives from that service. It may choose to either accept the lower service levels or 
increase I to offset reduced local contributions. This decision is influenced by a concern 
for creating moral hazard for local governments. If the state signals that it will offset any 
reductions in local revenue, it creates an incentive for localities to reduce their tax effort 
(Fisher and Papke 2000). The concept of local tax effort refers to the amount of revenue 
collected for a given tax base. Two localities may have the same property tax base per 
capita, but if one imposes a higher property tax rate then it is exerting greater tax effort 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3562735
 
 17 
than the other. The state does not want to incentivize localities to reduce their own-source 
taxes in response to intergovernmental revenue.  




Several other factors could shift the state’s political cost curve, 𝑐?̂?(𝑣?̂?), and create 
similar effects. The onset of a recession may changes voter’s preferences and increase the 
political cost of raising state revenue through taxation. The political climate or changes to 
the industrial base of the economy may also influence the political cost of taxes. The 
𝑏?̂?(?̅?) may also be shifted if state officials change their assessment of what mix of state 
and local services would provide the greatest political payoff. Perceptions of eroding 
infrastructure may make state highways and bridges more politically lucrative than 
schools and sewers. A recession could similarly raise the demand for state welfare 
services.  
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Local officials may attempt to identify the state’s minimum service threshold and 
cut local taxes up to the point that the state is providing the largest amount of 
intergovernmental aid possible. This strategy is risky, however, if the state’s preferences 
for local services regularly change during periods of fiscal stress. A shock that causes the 
state to deprioritize local services in favor of spending on state programs would reduce the 
political benefits that the state receives from funding the joint local service. Figure 4 depicts 
this outcome. If local governments were spending at L2 to maximize the state grant, the 
shift downward in the state benefit curve would result in the complete elimination of state 
aid to the program. Local governments in Georgia experienced this kind of dramatic cut to 
state aid when a property tax relief program was terminated in 2008 as the Great Recession 
shifted state budget priorities (Brien and Sjoquist 2014).  
Figure 4. Effect of State Fiscal Stress on Intergovernmental Aid 
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Local governments may be able to avoid this scenario by increasing their own 
contributions to the joint service and spending at L2. When the state is hit with a fiscal 
shock and it deprioritizes local services, it still values correcting the reginal externality 
enough to be willing to contribute I1. This analysis predicts that increasing local 
government contributions to the joint service may create a buffer that shields state 
contributions from cuts during periods of state budget reprioritization. Strategically, local 
governments should be cautious about aggressively seeking to shift costs to the state 
government to mitigate the risk of complete elimination of intergovernmental aid. 
 
Application for Special Districts 
The intergovernmental context of multiple incentives, organizations, actors, and 
agencies is the arena of intergovernmental revenue for sub-state governments. The 
organizational structure of the recipient organization may determine the role of 
intergovernmental funding for the joint service.  The US Census Bureau divides sub-state 
governments into four basic types: counties, municipalities, townships, and special 
districts. As of 2012, there were 90,056 sub-state governments which were composed of 
38,910 general purpose governments including 3,031 counties and 35,879 sub-county 
governments (19,519 municipalities and 16,360 townships) and 38,266 special districts 
governments and 12,880 school districts (Hogue 2013).  While the number of general 
purpose governments has been relatively constant over the last three decades, the number 
of special districts has increased dramatically to meet public service needs.  Most special 
district governments perform only a single function such as natural resources, fire 
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protection, water supply, housing and community development, sewerage, and other 
public services.  
Special district governments are quite different from general purpose 
governments. The legal boundaries of many special districts are not coterminous with 
general purpose governments, either counties or sub-counties.  This is due to the special 
legislation afforded special purpose governments in which the special purpose entity may 
cross any political boundary. Local governments may attempt to finance infrastructure 
improvements through the creation of a special district to avoid major budget constraints 
and political pressures (Douglas R. Porter 1992; Faulk and Killian 2017). Based on 
special-purpose governments in more than 300 metropolitan areas in the United States, 
Porter, Lin, and Peiser (1987) find that special districts are created increasingly to 
finance infrastructure to promote development.  
According to Mizany and Manatt (2002), there are some disadvantages as well as 
advantages to special districts. The existence of many special districts may lead to 
inconsistency with regional planning and a decrease in accountability. When special 
districts overlap jurisdictions, conflict often occurs, resulting in inefficiencies such as 
duplicated services. Using data from California special districts, entities organized as 
subordinate bureaus of general purpose governments had higher spending than 
independent district (Mehay 1984). Mehay’s (1984) study focused primary on 
expenditures, but the result implies that there may be a relationship between 
administrative dependence and the financial condition of the organization.  
Special districts have significant fiscal and administrative autonomy and the 
degree of autonomy varies. Eger (2006) provides a theoretical typology of special 
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purpose entities, based on the degree of financial and governing autonomy.  He classifies 
the governing autonomy into three levels: limited (advisory boards), moderate (self-
governing boards), and high (elected boards).  While many researchers have focused on 
the financial characteristics related to the ability to issue debt (Bennett and DiLorenzo 
1982; Leigland 1994; Merrifield 1994), Eger emphasizes the importance of the ability to 
tax.  When an entity has the ability to tax, the financial independence is higher than when 
the entity has the ability to only issue debt.  Although there is no clear relationship 
between intergovernmental revenue and financial autonomy, the financial autonomy – 
measured by the ability to tax – may affect the amount of intergovernmental revenue used 
to fund the service. 
The basic premise of this model is that the state is interested in controlling for 
externalities of the public service that spread beyond the borders of the government 
providing it. The creation of special purpose districts that spread across multiple general 
purpose governments may complicate the determination of whether any externalities 
exist. If, for example, a flood control district is formed that spans multiple municipalities, 
state officials may determine that the flood risk is wholly contained within the district and 
therefore no externality needs to be mitigated. This assessment may not be factually 
correct, however, and therefore all levels of government must face some uncertainty and 
incomplete information in their strategic decisions.  
 
Conclusion 
The purpose of modeling intergovernmental aid policy with the Diner’s Dilemma 
model is to provide practitioners and academics with a new tool for thinking about the 
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strategic implications of jointly funding public services. State and local governments may 
share an interest in providing certain services, but preferences for the quantity and quality 
of services may vary widely across levels of government. Our model focuses on services 
that provide benefits that spill over local government borders and influence other 
communities in the region. The construction and maintenance of capital projects such as 
flood control, wastewater treatment, and transportation infrastructure frequently provide 
regional benefits and regularly receive state funds. This model helps clarify the strategic 
choices both state and local officials face when deciding how to budget for these joint 
projects, particularly during periods of fiscal stress. 
For public practitioners, our analysis reveals the risks of trying to shift too much 
of the burden of funding joint services to another level of government. If state 
governments are primarily interested in correcting for regional service externalities, then 
there is a hard limit on how much states are willing to contribute to joint services. Local 
governments may induce the state to increase intergovernmental aid by cutting spending, 
but only to a point. Cutting too much may induce the state to shift from its highest 
potential level of funding to completely dropping support for the program. Using the 
Diners’ Dilemma analogy, an overly greedy member of a dinner party may lead members 
of the group to start asking for separate checks rather than splitting the bill.  
The predictions of this model generate multiple hypotheses that may guide further 
academic research into intergovernmental aid. The first prediction is that over a certain 
range, cuts to local government contributions to a jointly funded program would be offset 
by increases to state aid. Empirical research is needed to test whether this actually occurs 
and, if so, over what time frame. State replacement of local spending would be expected 
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to vary across spending types, so an empirical exercise should take care to identify 
similar types of joint programs.  
A second prediction is that that at a certain point, local government cuts would 
induce significant reductions to state aid. This occurs when the state’s contribution to the 
joint program would exceed how much it values mitigating the externality. An empirical 
challenge for testing this prediction is specifying the spending cuts. If the state is using a 
cost-benefit analysis approach to make its decision, then measuring spending in levels 
would be appropriate. If state officials are concerned about fairness and relative effort by 
each level of government, then the proportion of spending by the different partners may 
also influence fiscal behavior. Game theory experiments have found that participants will 
sacrifice some of their own wellbeing in order to punish actors that have behaved 
“unfairly” (Rabin 1993; Diekmann 2004). Empirical work is needed to measure whether 
state officials are willing to systematically withhold aid to prevent local governments 
from cutting taxes to shift costs upward. 
A third prediction from this model is that joint programs receiving the lowest 
possible level of local fiscal support are more likely to have their state aid terminated 
during periods of state fiscal stress. Assuming that state priorities shift during fiscal 
downturns to devalue jointly-funded local projects, the kinked benefit curve would leave 
localities with higher local spending unaffected, while those at the margin would be 
completely defunded. This hypothesis could be tested by examining the relative 
state/local funding ratios for joint programs and then identifying which programs had 
their state funding eliminated.  
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